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Chinese Economic Statecraft in Central Asia: the Case of Kyrgyzstan
Michalová, Anežka ; Horák, Slavomír (advisor) ; Šír, Jan (referee)
This work delves into the modalities of Chinese economic incentives and their reception in Kyrgyzstan. After tracing the rise of China as the main economic power in Central Asia since 2000, it uses Blanchard's and Ripsman's theory of economic statecraft to evaluate Kyrgyzstan's level of stateness and its susceptibility to economic inducements during president Atambayev's era. The objective is to address the issue of economic statecraft from the perspective of the target state and explain why Kyrgyzstan's co-operation with China has been less successful than in the case of other Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan's overall level of stateness was low but it did not result in compliance with Chinese demands. Instead, the low level of stateness prevented the government from overcoming domestic resistance to Chinese projects and implementing compliant behavior. Developmental aid and investment designed to favor the expansion of Chinese enterprises failed to gain the support of public opinion and contributed to the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment due to their involvement in corruption affairs and public scandals. Russia as a third-party actor represented an alternative for Kyrgyz policymakers and might have supported the resistance to Chinese endeavors.
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Public Choice Theory and the Russian Food Ban
Savory, Oliver ; Svoboda, Karel (advisor) ; Figueira, Filipa (referee) ; Šír, Jan (referee)
In this thesis I look at economic statecraft and try to examine why sanctions continue when they are failing, and why countries continue to use them despite debatable claims for success. For example, Hufbauer et. al.'s 2009 analysis shows sanctions only work 34% of the time, Pape (1997) estimates only 5%. Despite this economic statecraft is having a resurgence under the name "geoeconomics". This thesis builds off Kaempfer and Lowenberg's 1988 "Public Choice" theory of international economic sanctions. It hypothesises that in certain cases the domestic interests will be the primary goal of sanctions and therefore should be the primary focus of judging the success or failure of sanctions. Russia's 2014 food import ban is analysed to show that, despite failure to achieve any international goals, it is being successful at achieving the domestic goal of supporting Russian agriculture. The implications being that all current quantitative analysis of economic sanctions have potentially incorrectly measured sanctions as failures by not measuring them against the actual goals of the policies. Further research into this area to establish just how often sanctions are used primarily for domestic reasons, but even sanctions where domestic goals are only of secondary importance, their existence still needs to be...
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The Use of Economic Mechanisms in the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: the Case of Armenia
Motúzová, Diana ; Svoboda, Karel (advisor) ; Brisku, Adrian (referee)
The thesis analyses Russian economic statecraft in relation to Armenia. The thesis is focused on two areas, namely the Russian response to the foreign policy orientation of Armenia and its significant internal political changes. The aim of the thesis is to compare the extent to which Russia uses economic mechanisms on both levels. The thesis draws on Baldwin's concept of economic statecraft, focusing on the Russian "carrot and stick" policy. In the foreign policy area, the economic tools that Russia used in attempt to influence Armenia's decision in its dilemma between European and Eurasian integration are analysed. In the internal policy area, the thesis is focused on major events from 2015 to 2018, which to some extent also affected the Russian side. Positive incentives and coercive methods applied by Russia during this period are also examined. An analysis of the Russian "carrot and stick" policy has pointed out that Moscow is more strongly involved in foreign policy of Armenia if it feels an immediate threat to its interests. Russia applies positive incentives in situations when it needs to reduce internal tensions in Armenia, which may also be directed against Moscow. If there are major internal political changes in this South Caucasus republic, yet without serious foreign policy implications,...
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