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Esaays on Corporate Bankruptcy
Vychodil, Ondřej ; Münich, Daniel (advisor) ; White, Michelle J. (referee) ; Weill, Laurent (referee)
Research Journal Articles Working Papers Research in Brief Series Dissertations Other Publications Featured Article Dissertations Date: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 - 10:30 Ondřej Vychodil: "Essays on Corporate Bankruptcy" Dissertation Committee: Gérard Roland (chair) Libor Dušek (local chair) Evžen Kočenda Jan Hanousek Abstract: The dissertation consists of three chapters on corporate bankruptcy: In the first chapter (joint with Ondřej Knot), we develop a model of a debt-contracting problem under bankruptcy regimes differing by a degree of softness. In the model, the degree of softness is associated with the extent to which the absolute priority rule can be violated. We show that when the degree of softness can be set individually for each project, then the debtor's tendency to excessive risk-taking can be eliminated and the first best solution can be attained. When it is given exogenously by a bankruptcy law, then a completely tough law results in a lower distortion from the first best than a soft law with a moderate degree of softness. The second chapter documents that the recent Czech bankruptcy practice tended to delay the ultimate exit of a firm when it can be expected to have a harsher ex-post effect on the firm's employees. Bankruptcy duration is regressed on unemployment rate, size and other...
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Esaays on Corporate Bankruptcy
Vychodil, Ondřej ; Münich, Daniel (advisor) ; White, Michelle J. (referee) ; Weill, Laurent (referee)
Research Journal Articles Working Papers Research in Brief Series Dissertations Other Publications Featured Article Dissertations Date: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 - 10:30 Ondřej Vychodil: "Essays on Corporate Bankruptcy" Dissertation Committee: Gérard Roland (chair) Libor Dušek (local chair) Evžen Kočenda Jan Hanousek Abstract: The dissertation consists of three chapters on corporate bankruptcy: In the first chapter (joint with Ondřej Knot), we develop a model of a debt-contracting problem under bankruptcy regimes differing by a degree of softness. In the model, the degree of softness is associated with the extent to which the absolute priority rule can be violated. We show that when the degree of softness can be set individually for each project, then the debtor's tendency to excessive risk-taking can be eliminated and the first best solution can be attained. When it is given exogenously by a bankruptcy law, then a completely tough law results in a lower distortion from the first best than a soft law with a moderate degree of softness. The second chapter documents that the recent Czech bankruptcy practice tended to delay the ultimate exit of a firm when it can be expected to have a harsher ex-post effect on the firm's employees. Bankruptcy duration is regressed on unemployment rate, size and other...
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