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Essays in Experimental Economics
Miklánek, Tomáš ; Katuščák, Peter (advisor) ; Servátka, Maroš (referee) ; Ortmann, Andreas (referee)
Essays in Experimental Economics Tomáš Miklánek Abstract The first chapter introduces a theoretical model of inequality aversion which can also be used in an environment with information asymmetries. The model is based on the non-paternalistic approach where, the own utility function incorporates the utility of other people as perceived by a decision maker. Moreover it allows extensions for other motives which may result in pro-social behavior. I extend the model by adding shame aversion as an additional driver for apparently altruistic behavior. Threat of shame is induced by different levels of exposure of either own actions or identity to the third party observers. I also experimentally test predictions of the model using a very simple environment of a dictator's game. The experimental design aims to remove additional confounding behavioral effects present in the previous literature. The results suggest that even a very small exposure results in significantly higher amounts sent to recipients. The analysis also shows that the agents, who believe that they can conceal their own actions in front of the less informed counterpart, exploit this information asymmetry for their monetary benefit. The second chapter examines endogenous decisions to acquire useful information. My experimental design tries to test...
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Essays on Fairness, Inequality, and Uncertainty
Babický, Vítězslav ; Ortmann, Andreas (advisor) ; Katuščák, Peter (referee) ; Servátka, Maroš (referee)
Chapter I. Recent theories of fairness (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) have typically used the assumption of ex ante known pie size. Here I explore theoretically the ramifications of pie size being unknown ex ante. Using a simple allocation problem known as dictator game, I find that attitude to fairness is systematically and intuitively related to risk and risk attitude. Results from informal experiments support the model proposed here. Chapter II. The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems - the Dictator and Ultimatum games - we explore whether, and exactly how, unknown pie sizes with varying degrees of risk ("endowment risk") influence individual behavior. We derive theoretical predictions for these games using utility functions that capture additively separable constant relative risk aversion and inequality aversion. We experimentally test the theoretical predictions using two subject pools: students at Czech Technical University and employees of Prague City Hall. We find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in...
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Essays in Behavioral Economics
Lanchava, Lasha ; Katuščák, Peter (advisor) ; Duersch, Peter (referee) ; Krawczyk, Michal (referee)
Introduction This dissertation consists of three experimental studies. The first chapter is based on a laboratory experiment in the field. The second chapter is a laboratory experiment study, and the third chapter exploits and analyses a natural experiment. The first chapter of this work links two literature strands providing experimental evidence of the intergenerational transmission of other-regarding preferences and offering new insights about where these preferences originate. A large body of literature has been developed recently regarding the importance and development of other-regarding preferences. The literature on cultural transmission of various attitudes, preferences, skills, and economic outcomes is abundant. Though both the development of children's other-regarding preferences and its dependence on their socio-economic background have been relatively well studied, less is known about intergenerational transmission of other-regarding preferences and the nature of the transmission process.. The second chapter aims to understand how people behave when their choice autonomy is threatened. Despite much empirical evidence in the field of psychology, there has been no economic study analyzing? the value of free choice. This chapter brings the well known concept of psychological reactance in social...
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The Role of Beauty in the Labor Market
Kraft, Philipp ; Katuščák, Peter (advisor) ; Biddle, Jeff (referee) ; Gergaud, Olivier (referee)
The present study breaks new ground in labor economic research by providing direct evidence of potential discrimination among attractive and unattractive job candidates. It utilizes a field experiment, the so-called 'CV testing approach' (Jowell and Prescott- Clarke, 1970) to determine discrimination in recruitment based on physical attractiveness. Two individuals who are equivalent on all required and desired job characteristics except their physical attractiveness, apply for the same vacancy. Responses are carefully documented and discrimination is measured by which one job applicant is invited for an interview relative to the other. Application photos are used to examine the level of discrimination regarding an applicant's physical attractiveness. The experiment is conducted among a set of 990 German firms. Results show that attractive candidates are on average 14% more likely to get an invitation for an interview. Beauty was shown to have a positive impact on one's labor market outcome by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), who dubbed it the 'beauty premium'. Later research in psychology then showed beauty to serve as a signal for intelligence (Kanazawa and Kovar, 2004). Results of the present study, using data from the National University of La Plata, Argentina, show that physically attractive...
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Essays on Matching Markets
Vozár, Mário ; Katuščák, Peter (advisor) ; Veramendi, Gregory (referee) ; Kahanec, Martin (referee)
The first chapter of this work develops a theoretical model of marriage market which complements existing models explaining the phenomenon of match separation. While existing models assume that agents' characteristics do not change over time, I account for the effect of aging on partners' wealth and physical attractiveness to introduce yet another explanation of the phenomenon of divorce. Furthermore, I use the model to analyze how increased female income prospects influence stability of the matches. The objective of the second chapter is to analyze significance of different determinants of match separation proposed by matching market theory. First, we construct unique dataset from Czech ballroom dancing association records, which allows us to assess the quality of individual matches by evaluating dancers' performance throughout their career. Being able to observe the match quality helps us then to individually infer about the potential cause of match separation and to show that both prevalent theories of reason for match separation discussed in the theoretical literature, search frictions and initial uncertainty about match quality, play a significant role in reality and both should be taken into account when match separations are studied. The last chapter concentrates on the effect of growing...
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Does anticipated regret really matter? Revisiting the role of feedback in auction bidding
Katuščák, Peter ; Michelucci, Fabio ; Zajíček, M.
Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in first price auctions? Filiz- Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain this as an effect of anticipated regret combined with the assumption that feedback directly affects salience of regret relative to material payoff. We revisit this important market design issue using four different auction protocols and a large sample of subjects. We do not find any systematic effect of feedback on the average bid/value ratio. This evidence indicates either the lack of anticipated regret or its manipulability by feedback in one-shot auctions.
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Does anticipated regret really matter? Revisiting the role of feedback in auction bidding
Katuščák, Peter ; Michelucci, Fabio ; Zajíček, M.
Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in the first price auction? Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain their finding by anticipated regret combined with the assumption that feedback directly affects salience of regret relative to material payoff. We revisit this important market design issue using four different auction protocols and a large sample of subjects. We do not find any systematic effect of feedback on the average bid/value ratio. This evidence contradicts a presence of anticipated regret or its manipulability by feedback in one-shot auctions.
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