Národní úložiště šedé literatury Nalezeno 8 záznamů.  Hledání trvalo 0.00 vteřin. 
The Logica Yearbook
Childers, Timothy ; Majer, Ondrej
The volume comprises most of the papers presented at the international symposium LOGICA 2002. Reflecting the tradition of the LOGICA symposia, the papers deal with the broad range of problems in logic relevant to philosophy.
Meaning and Inference
Peregrin, Jaroslav
According to certain semantic theories, the meaning of an expression is, principally, its inferential role. In this paper we first propose an exact definition of the concept of inferential role, and then go on to examine the question whether subscribing to inferentialism necessitates throwing away existing theories of formal semantics, as we know them from logic, or whether these could be somehow accomodated within the inferentialist framework. The conclusion we reach is that it is possible to make an inferentialist sense of even those common semantic theories which are usually considered as incompatible with inferentialism, such as the standard semantics of second-order logic.
(In) Transparent Intensional Logic (some remarks to the notion of trivialisation in TIL)
Majer, Ondrej
Pavel Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL)is a power ful tool for the logical analysis of natural language. The article discusses one of the key notions of TIL - the notion of trivialisation. Trivialisation belongs to the formal apparatus of the theory but is essentially connected to its philosophical background. The aim of the paper is to clarify the philosophical role of trivialisation and to discuss its counterparts in standard logical systems.
The Logica Yearbook 2000
Majer, Ondrej
The volume comprises most of the papers presented at the international symposium LOGICA 2000. Following the traditiof the LOGICA symposia, the papers deal with a broad range of problems in logic revelant to philosophy. Contributors include Gabriel Sandu, Jaroslav Peregrin and Göran Sundholm.
Absolute and Relative Concepts in Logic
Peregrin, Jaroslav
We should distinguish two kinds of logical pursuit. The first is the pursuit of the explication of the absolute concepts of truth, proof, consequence etc.; the second is the pursuit of their counterparts which are relativized to a linguistic system. The former leads to the 'logic as a language' notion; the other to the 'logic as a calculus' one. These two pursuits are, of course, not unrelated (the latter may be taken as a way of carrying out the former); however, many logicians appear to simply identify logic with one of them. And while it is feasible to identify logic with the first of them (possibly taking the second as a means of accomplishing it), it is not so feasible to identify it with the second.
Propositional Attitudes Revised
Materna, Pavel ; Duží, M.
A dialogue concerning the type-theoretical character of propositional attitudes. One kind can be defined as a relation that links the individual (subject) with the construction underlying the subordinate clause, the second kind links the individual with the proposition denoted by that sentence. The second kind is out of question if the subordinate clause is a mathematical one.
The Logica Yearbook 1999
Childers, Timothy
The Logica Yearbook 1999 contains a selection of papers delivered at the LOGICA 1999 conference. The contributions cover a wide variety of topics in philosophical logic, reflecting the character of the conference. Contributors include Stuart Shapiro, Goran Sundholm, Jan Wolenski, Wlodek Rabinowicz, J.H. Sobel and Jaroslav Peregrin.
Simple Concepts and Simple Expressions
Materna, Pavel
Materna's explication of concepts as abstract procedures, i.e., constructions, has to meet the following problem: Does it hold that analysing expressions of a natural language we have to associate simple expressions (mostly: consisting of one word only) with simple concepts, i.e., constructions which are not analysable into other constructions? Some necessary definitions and principles.

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