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Firm life cycle and cost of debt
Amin, A. ; Bowler, B. ; Hasan, M. M. ; Lobo, G. L. ; Trešl, Jiří
This paper examines the relation between the corporate life cycle and lending spreads. Using a sample of 20,307 firm-loan observations spanning 5,076 publicly traded U.S. firms, we find that lending spreads follow a U-shape pattern across the life cycle phases. This pattern is in addition to the variation explained by typical controls. In a multivariate analysis, we find that firms in the introduction and decline phases pay lending spreads that are greater than firms in the mature phase (differences of 6 percent and 12 percent, respectively). We explore omitted variables bias and instrumental variable estimation in robustness testing and find that the shape pattern persists. Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions regarding the relationship between the corporate life cycle and various lending risks.
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Intra-industry transfer of information inferred from trading volume
Brushko, Iuliia ; Ferris, S. P. ; Hanousek, Jan ; Trešl, Jiří
This study examines the responsiveness of trading volume to a firm’s earnings announcements. We find that the volume and earnings surprise information generated at the first earnings announcement within an industry help to explain the stock returns of the non-announcing firm. Specifically, it explains their equity performance at the time of the first industry announcement and then again after their own earnings announcement. These results provide novel insights into how earnings announcements contain both firm specific as well as industry information that is value relevant for investors.
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To bribe or not to bribe? Corruption uncertainty and corporate practices
Hanousek, Jan ; Shamshur, Anastasiya ; Trešl, Jiří
Using a large sample of private firms over the period from 2001 to 2013, we study the effect of corruption uncertainty on corporate investments and cash holdings. We find that a higher uncertainty about the level of corruption is associated with lower corporate investments and lower cash holdings. These results are sensitive to the ownership structure of a firm. Firms with no foreign majority ownership appear to be more sensitive to corruption-induced uncertainty than majority-controlled foreign firms. They significantly decrease their investments and cash holdings. We hypothesize that they move their cash off-balance-sheet to create cash reserves as the uncertainty of when, whom, and how much to bribe increases.
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