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The Logic of Nuclear Strategy Explaining Small Nuclear Arsenals
Ludvík, Jan ; Hynek, Nikola (advisor) ; Eichler, Jan (referee) ; Sokov, Nikolai N. (referee)
Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Political Studies Jan Ludvik The Logic of Nuclear Strategy Explaining Small Nuclear Arsenals Ph.D. Thesis Prague 2014 ABSTRACT At this thesis I am trying to address two critical questions: i) how does deterrence work between a country with a small nuclear arsenal and a more powerful challenger? and ii) what makes it work? My research is inspired by the method of historical comparative case studies and aims at repairing several biases in the state of the art deterrence literature, most importantly the empirically unwarranted analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence. Drawing from available theoretical literature, the broadest possible range of theoretically underpinned plausible factors is included in the analysis to grasp the complexity of deterrence relations the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in the dyads between a state with a small nuclear arsenal and its more powerful enemy. Military aspects of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, are part of the comparison together with various perceptional factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. Five cases anchor the comparison in empirical reality covering the history of hostile relations between the United States and...
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