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The UN Security Council: the Voting Procedure and Effectiveness
Minárová, Martina ; Parízek, Michal (advisor) ; Karlas, Jan (referee)
This Bachelor thesis deals with the UN Security Council (SC), its voting procedure and effectiveness. A hypothetic change of the SC voting procedure is applied in the thesis. Such change consists in establishing the requirement of at least two or more negative votes of the SC permanent members for a draft resolution to be rejected. The goal is to discover what would be the consequences of the hypothetic change of Security Council voting procedure on voting outcomes. In addition, I aim to find out how would change the ability of the Security Council permanent members to further their national interests? Analysis is focused on the blocked SC resolutions with the negative vote of only one of its five permanent members. In the last part of the analysis I aim to discover, whether there is any connection between the structure of the SC voting procedure in the security issues discussed in the GA. Analysis is based on the presumption, that some security issues do not become a matter of the SC voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members in the GA. Such issues would be probably blocked in the SC. It means that certain security issues do not appear in the Security Council due to the structure of its voting procedure.
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Vote-buying in the United Nations General Assembly
Minárová, Martina ; Parízek, Michal (advisor) ; Karlas, Jan (referee)
This master thesis deals with vote-buying in the United Nations General Assembly. The analysis focuses on the General Assembly voting outcomes and the degree of voting coincidence of the UN member states with the USA. The thesis assumes that the General Assembly voting outcomes do not reflect the real interests of all member states, but they are influenced by the US preferences. The goal of the thesis is to examine the relationship between the states' voting coincidence with the USA and the side payments provided by the USA. The thesis applies a multiple regression analysis focusing on the General Assembly resolutions adopted by majority voting in the time period 1990-2014. The analysis includes financial and non-financial side payments. It aims to reveal the presence of US vote-buying behaviour and to identify the type of side payments provided by the USA.
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The UN Security Council: the Voting Procedure and Effectiveness
Minárová, Martina ; Parízek, Michal (advisor) ; Karlas, Jan (referee)
This Bachelor thesis deals with the UN Security Council (SC), its voting procedure and effectiveness. A hypothetic change of the SC voting procedure is applied in the thesis. Such change consists in establishing the requirement of at least two or more negative votes of the SC permanent members for a draft resolution to be rejected. The goal is to discover what would be the consequences of the hypothetic change of Security Council voting procedure on voting outcomes. In addition, I aim to find out how would change the ability of the Security Council permanent members to further their national interests? Analysis is focused on the blocked SC resolutions with the negative vote of only one of its five permanent members. In the last part of the analysis I aim to discover, whether there is any connection between the structure of the SC voting procedure in the security issues discussed in the GA. Analysis is based on the presumption, that some security issues do not become a matter of the SC voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members in the GA. Such issues would be probably blocked in the SC. It means that certain security issues do not appear in the Security Council due to the structure of its voting procedure.
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