National Repository of Grey Literature 1 records found  Search took 0.00 seconds. 

Could not find similar documents for this query.
Strategies in pay-per-bid auctions
Podešva, Jiří ; Svoboda, Miroslav (advisor) ; Dudáková, Tereza (referee)
In this paper I analyze pay-per-bid auctions. On the bids made in auctions I research strategies of players. I confirmed the hypothesis that players timed signal bids. I have demonstrated that shortening the interval extension auction decreases signaling in the auctions. Then I haven't demonstrated reduction signaling in beginner auctions. I also concluded, that the benefits in form of restoration of half used coupons for the player who was at the second place, doesn't increase the average number of bids made in auctions. My final conclusion is that the auctions with cheaper goods introduce on average higher returns for auctioneer than the auctions with more expensive goods.

Interested in being notified about new results for this query?
Subscribe to the RSS feed.