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Social contacts in the times of covid-19
Pertold, Filip ; Lichard, T.
The rate of spread of the epidemic is largely influenced by the number of contacts. Using the data “Life during the pandemic”, we analyze the development of the number of contacts during 2020. The number of contacts reported in the sociological survey is strongly correlated with both the R number (reproduction number) and the objective measurement of activity in the Google mobility report. The basic goal of this analysis is to show how the number of contacts is linked to the reported activities, which are directly or indirectly affected by government measures.
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Essays on Public Finance
Lichard, Tomáš ; Hanousek, Jan (advisor) ; Palda, Filip (referee) ; Fialová, Kamila (referee)
This dissertation analyzes two presently widely discussed topics in Public Finance: relationship between the shadow economy and tax policy, and the effect of financial transaction taxes on the functioning of financial markets. The first chapter describes presently used estimators of the size of the shadow economy, with a focus on microeconomic estimators. It illustrates problems with assumptions that a vast majority of recent studies use to identify underreporting (mainly the comparison of employed and self-employed) using data from four transition economies as an example. It shows that the most common assumption, that self-employed evade whereas employees do not is probably too strict in less compliant economies, where even employees have opportunities to evade through e.g. under-the-table wages or by moonlighting at unreported jobs. The second chapter develops an estimator of unreported income that relaxes some of these strict assumptions. Assuming only that tax-evading households have a higher consumption- income gap than non-evaders in surveys, an endogenous switching model with unknown sample separation enables the estimation of both the probability of hiding income and the expected amount of unreported income for each household. Using data from Czech and Slovak household...
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Tax reforms and inter-temporal shifting of corporate income: evidence from tax records in Slovakia
Bukovina, J. ; Lichard, Tomáš ; Palguta, J. ; Žúdel, B.
We use administrative tax return data for all corporations in Slovakia to demonstrate how policies facilitating inter-temporal income shifting result in elevated corporate income tax (CIT) elasticity estimates. Our strategy exploits kinks in the statutory tax schedules and policy reforms of tax carry-forwards. If inter-temporal shifting is neglected, our bunching estimates imply CIT elasticity of up to 0.65, suggesting a highly sensitive tax base with respect to the marginal tax rate. However, we show that CIT elasticity drops at least 21.2-49.1% when we remove the inter-temporal shifting component. This correction significantly reduces the estimated marginal excess burden of corporate taxation.
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Do women face a glass ceiling at home? The division of household labor among dual-earner couples
Lichard, Tomáš ; Pertold, Filip ; Škoda, S.
In this paper we ask how the division of household labor varies across heterosexual dual-earner couples with different relative wages with a focus on differences between Southern and Western Europe. Using the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions we first show that high income married or cohabiting women do twice as much housework as single women in Southern Europe. Further, their time spent in household production relative to their spouses’ time in Southern Europe is the same regardless of their relative wages, while in Western Europe we find positive elasticity of substitution in household production with respect to relative wages. We thus present positive evidence for the presence of a “second-shift” that women face in Southern Europe, which may stem from regional gender norms. Our findings hold after instrumenting for relative wages using the relative wages of similar socio-economic groups in other countries.
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Essays on Public Finance
Lichard, Tomáš ; Hanousek, Jan (advisor) ; Palda, Filip (referee) ; Fialová, Kamila (referee)
This dissertation analyzes two presently widely discussed topics in Public Finance: relationship between the shadow economy and tax policy, and the effect of financial transaction taxes on the functioning of financial markets. The first chapter describes presently used estimators of the size of the shadow economy, with a focus on microeconomic estimators. It illustrates problems with assumptions that a vast majority of recent studies use to identify underreporting (mainly the comparison of employed and self-employed) using data from four transition economies as an example. It shows that the most common assumption, that self-employed evade whereas employees do not is probably too strict in less compliant economies, where even employees have opportunities to evade through e.g. under-the-table wages or by moonlighting at unreported jobs. The second chapter develops an estimator of unreported income that relaxes some of these strict assumptions. Assuming only that tax-evading households have a higher consumption- income gap than non-evaders in surveys, an endogenous switching model with unknown sample separation enables the estimation of both the probability of hiding income and the expected amount of unreported income for each household. Using data from Czech and Slovak household...
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Every vote counts: evidence on corruption culture peer effects from representatives' voting attendance
Lichard, Tomáš ; Žúdel, Branislav
In this paper we study the effect of peers and culture on corrupt behavior. We use the European Parliament (EP) as a natural laboratory, as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) face the same institutional setting, however they differ in corruption culture due to different nationalities. The research question is whether and to what extent the corrupt behavior among MEPs from old EU member states changes after they interact with the MEPs from new EU member states who entered the European Parliament in 2004. We study this question by analyzing the patterns of shirking behavior, as MEPs recieve a per diem compensation for every day she signs the attendance sheet.
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