National Repository of Grey Literature 2 records found  Search took 0.01 seconds. 
Human dignity: universal principle in particular application
Broz, Jan ; Kysela, Jan (advisor) ; Kosek, Jan (referee)
This thesis probes the relevance of objections against newly establishing contemporary paradigm of human dignity, based on connection between dignity and Kantian views on human autonomy, which possess universalistic ambitions. First chapter introduces the fundamental concepts of human dignity during history. The chapter shows there have been evolved at least three different concepts: (i) dignity as an internal value; (ii) dignity as a social status; and (iii) dignity as a certain manner of social behavior. Second chapter consequently deals with courts` techniques regarding the dignity as a legal concept. The conclusions extrapolated from German, Israeli and South African judicial decision-making noticeably support objections raised in contemporary discourse against the abovementioned universalistic concept. In spite of these universalistic ambitions, human dignity represents concept enabling to construe individual human rights through values shared by vast majority in certain jurisdictions. This mindset naturally leads to the limitation of individual freedom rather to its expansion, in the name of an idea that ideal moral order objectively exists. Consequently, the authority of classical human rights is considerably weakened. In third chapter the effort to analyze and construe current judicial practice is...
Human dignity: universal principle in particular application
Broz, Jan ; Kysela, Jan (advisor) ; Kosek, Jan (referee)
This thesis probes the relevance of objections against newly establishing contemporary paradigm of human dignity, based on connection between dignity and Kantian views on human autonomy, which possess universalistic ambitions. First chapter introduces the fundamental concepts of human dignity during history. The chapter shows there have been evolved at least three different concepts: (i) dignity as an internal value; (ii) dignity as a social status; and (iii) dignity as a certain manner of social behavior. Second chapter consequently deals with courts` techniques regarding the dignity as a legal concept. The conclusions extrapolated from German, Israeli and South African judicial decision-making noticeably support objections raised in contemporary discourse against the abovementioned universalistic concept. In spite of these universalistic ambitions, human dignity represents concept enabling to construe individual human rights through values shared by vast majority in certain jurisdictions. This mindset naturally leads to the limitation of individual freedom rather to its expansion, in the name of an idea that ideal moral order objectively exists. Consequently, the authority of classical human rights is considerably weakened. In third chapter the effort to analyze and construe current judicial practice is...

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