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National Repository of Grey Literature 2 records found  Search took 0.01 seconds. 
Information complexity of strategic voting
 Palguta, Ján ; Turnovec, František (advisor) ; Doležel, Pavel (referee)
This thesis in political economy considers the concept of strategic optimisation of voting behaviour under imperfect information. Under strategic voting we understand an act of voting for other than voter s best preferred (order of) alternatives. Motivation for this thesis comes from the empirically witnessed fact that a substantial portion of the electorate votes for their second or third best preferred alternatives, seeing that their most preferred alternatives face in expectation low probabilities of voting success. At other instances, the voters vote strategically with the intentions of strengthening the coalitional partners to their best choices or to weaken the coalitional partners of the undesired parties. Despite to the evident individual rationality of the strategic voting, strategic voting is typically socially suboptimal. Strategic voting leads to social choices that do not reflect the truthful preferences of the public. Via a series of computation-based simulations the thesis studies the relative vulnerability of the most common voting procedures to strategic manipulation. The thesis categorizes these voting procedures by their degree of susceptibility to voting manipulation. By standard econometric techniques it confirms that strategic voting is most threatening in small groups,...
Detailed record
Information complexity of strategic voting
 Palguta, Ján ; Turnovec, František (advisor) ; Doležel, Pavel (referee)
This thesis in political economy considers the concept of strategic optimisation of voting behaviour under imperfect information. Under strategic voting we understand an act of voting for other than voter s best preferred (order of) alternatives. Motivation for this thesis comes from the empirically witnessed fact that a substantial portion of the electorate votes for their second or third best preferred alternatives, seeing that their most preferred alternatives face in expectation low probabilities of voting success. At other instances, the voters vote strategically with the intentions of strengthening the coalitional partners to their best choices or to weaken the coalitional partners of the undesired parties. Despite to the evident individual rationality of the strategic voting, strategic voting is typically socially suboptimal. Strategic voting leads to social choices that do not reflect the truthful preferences of the public. Via a series of computation-based simulations the thesis studies the relative vulnerability of the most common voting procedures to strategic manipulation. The thesis categorizes these voting procedures by their degree of susceptibility to voting manipulation. By standard econometric techniques it confirms that strategic voting is most threatening in small groups,...
Detailed record

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