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Determinants of Executive Compensation in Czech Companies
Keše, Tibor ; Geršl, Adam (advisor) ; Klinger, Tomáš (referee)
In this thesis we assess executive compensation in the Czech Republic. Our study adds to scarce literature written on this topic regarding the Czech environment. We analyze a dataset of 100 large Czech companies, we try to find the factors influencing income of Czech managers and we compare our results to existing empirical research. We found that factors such as company's size, performance or concentration and nature of ownership are determinants of the level of executive compensation. Furthermore, we find that annual growth in managerial income is to some extent sensitive to annual performance of the company. We conclude that the environment of executive compensation in the Czech Republic fits predictions of both underlying theories, optimal contracting and rent extraction view, and the compensation culture seems comparable to other countries. JEL Classification J31, M52, L25 Keywords Executive compensation, optimal contracting, rent extraction, performance sensitivity
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Determinants of Executive Compensation in Czech Companies
Keše, Tibor ; Geršl, Adam (advisor) ; Klinger, Tomáš (referee)
In this thesis we assess executive compensation in the Czech Republic. Our study adds to scarce literature written on this topic regarding the Czech environment. We analyze a dataset of 100 large Czech companies, we try to find the factors influencing income of Czech managers and we compare our results to existing empirical research. We found that factors such as company's size, performance or concentration and nature of ownership are determinants of the level of executive compensation. Furthermore, we find that annual growth in managerial income is to some extent sensitive to annual performance of the company. We conclude that the environment of executive compensation in the Czech Republic fits predictions of both underlying theories, optimal contracting and rent extraction view, and the compensation culture seems comparable to other countries. JEL Classification J31, M52, L25 Keywords Executive compensation, optimal contracting, rent extraction, performance sensitivity
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Získávání renty velkými vlastníky akcií: důkaz s použitím dividendové politiky v České republice
Bena, Jan ; Hanousek, Jan
Using cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing dividends paid across varying corporate ownership structures - concentration, type, and domicile of ownership - we quantify these effects and reveal that they are substantial. We find that the target payout ratio for firms with majority ownership is low but that the presence of a significant minority shareholder increases the target payout ratio and hence precludes a majority owner from extracting rent. In contrast to other studies from developed markets, our unique dataset from the Czech Republic for the period 1996-2003 permits us to take account of the endogeneity of ownership.
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Získávání renty velkými vlastníky akcií: důkaz s použitím dividendové politiky v České republice
Bena, Jan ; Hanousek, Jan
Using cross-sectional analysis of corporate dividend policy we show that large shareholders extract rents from firms and expropriate minority shareholders in the weak corporate governance environment of an emerging economy. By comparing dividends paid across varying corporate ownership structures - concentration, type, and domicile of ownership - we quantify these effects and reveal that they are substantial. We find that the target payout ratio for firms with majority ownership is low but that the presence of a significant minority shareholder increases the target payout ratio and hence precludes a majority owner from extracting rent. In contrast to other studies from developed markets, our unique dataset from the Czech Republic for the period 1996-2003 permits us to take account of the endogeneity of ownership.
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