Home > Search Results: keywords:"heterogeneous beliefs"
Search:
Search Tips :: Advanced Search
Search collections:
Sort by: Display results: Output format:
National Repository of Grey Literature 1 records found  Search took 0.00 seconds. 
Optimally biased expertise
 Ilinov, Pavel ; Matveenko, A. ; Senkov, Maxim ; Starkov, E.
This paper shows that the principal can strictly benefit from delegating a decision to an agent whose opinion differs from that of the principal. We consider a “delegated expertise” problem in which the agent has an advantage in information acquisition relative to the principal, as opposed to having preexisting private information. When the principal is ex ante predisposed towards some action, it is optimal for her to hire an agent who is predisposed towards the same action, but to a smaller extent, since such an agent would acquire more information, which outweighs the bias stemming from misalignment. We show that belief misalignment between an agent and a principal is a viable instrument in delegation, performing on par with contracting and communication in a class of problems.
Detailed record

Interested in being notified about new results for this query?
Subscribe to the RSS feed.
Digital Repository :: Search :: Submit :: Personalize :: Help
Powered by Invenio v1.1.2
Maintained by admin.invenio@techlib.cz
This site is also available in the following languages:
Česky  English