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Algorithmic complexity of solution concepts in selected classes of non-cooperative games
Wichera, Adam ; Majer, Ondřej (advisor) ; Kroupa, Tomáš (referee)
Title: Algorithmic complexity of solution concepts in selected classes of non-cooperative games Author: Adam Wichera Department: Department of Logic Supervisor: RNDr. Ondřej Majer, CSc. Supervisor's e-mail address: majer@ u.cas.cz Abstract In the presented work we study natural algorthmic problems rising from the concept of Nash Equilibrium. The problem of it's existence is trivial, because it follows from Nash The- orem of completeness of Nash Equilibria. Even related search problem doesn't seem to belong to NP-complete class, the reason being the very fact, that existence of Nash Equilibria is certain. Interesting observation is that every natural extension of this problem seems to be NP-complete. Many of such problems have been proven to be NP-complete through reduction of SAT problem, Klike problem or problem of searching subcover of certain size. The question, wheather the pro- blem of existence of assymmetric Nash equilibria of symmeric game ts with the others, in being NP-complete, has been an open problem. Here we show how to alternate the proof from [? ] and apply the construction to problem of existence of assymetric equilibria and therefore prove its NP-completness. Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Algorithmic complexity, Non-cooperative games, Game Theory, Assymetric equilibria, 1
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