Home > Search Results: keywords:"ARM Trustzone"
Search:
Search Tips :: Advanced Search
Search collections:
Sort by: Display results: Output format:
National Repository of Grey Literature 2 records found  Search took 0.01 seconds. 
Software and Hardware Based Fault Injection Attacks against the CPU and MCU
 Lörinc, Marek ; Hanáček, Petr (referee) ; Perešíni, Martin (advisor)
The thesis deals with attacks that cause faults in CPU and MCU calculations. A short voltage change in CPU or MCU is used to trigger the error. The theoretical part of the thesis deals with the description of how to cause and exploit these errors. This section also describes the most well-known protection against hardware attacks, which is a trusted execution environment (TEE). Inject a fault to TEE is the primary target of fault attacks. The practical part deals with the replication of PlunderVolt and VoltPillager attacks on Intel processors with an activated TEE SGX. Several experiments were performed to trigger faults in RSA and AES encryption within the SGX enclave. To obtain the encryption key from these errors, known analysis methods were used. The practical part also deals with the replication of the attack on ARM microcontrollers with an active TEE TrustZone-M.
Detailed record
Software and Hardware Based Fault Injection Attacks against the CPU and MCU
 Lörinc, Marek ; Hanáček, Petr (referee) ; Perešíni, Martin (advisor)
The thesis deals with attacks that cause faults in CPU and MCU calculations. A short voltage change in CPU or MCU is used to trigger the error. The theoretical part of the thesis deals with the description of how to cause and exploit these errors. This section also describes the most well-known protection against hardware attacks, which is a trusted execution environment (TEE). Inject a fault to TEE is the primary target of fault attacks. The practical part deals with the replication of PlunderVolt and VoltPillager attacks on Intel processors with an activated TEE SGX. Several experiments were performed to trigger faults in RSA and AES encryption within the SGX enclave. To obtain the encryption key from these errors, known analysis methods were used. The practical part also deals with the replication of the attack on ARM microcontrollers with an active TEE TrustZone-M.
Detailed record

Interested in being notified about new results for this query?
Subscribe to the RSS feed.
Digital Repository :: Search :: Submit :: Personalize :: Help
Powered by Invenio v1.1.2
Maintained by admin.invenio@techlib.cz
This site is also available in the following languages:
Česky  English