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Maurice Drury and Ludwig Wittgenstein
Schmoranz, Tereza ; Hill, James (referee) ; Peregrin, Jaroslav (advisor)
The aim oj this essay is to "discover" for the Czech scholarly public a work of considerable importance for both the field of philosophy and the domain established on the borderline between philosophy and psychiatry. In a critical analysis oj the application ofWi ttgenstein 's philosophical method to some of the delicate problems of psychiatry, this essay intends to contribute to a deeper insight into the relationship between these fields and also to facilitate their interaction.
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Consciousness and the Self: the theories of John Searle and Antonio Damasio
Šebešová, Petra ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
The thesis deals with the relationship of consciousness and the self, as it is present in the consciousness theories of John Searle and Antonio Damasio. Consciousness is taken by both authors as an essentially subjective phenomenon and it is analyzed as such. Yet at the same time, they take it to be a natural part of the physical world. First, Searle's arguments concerning the subjective nature of consciousness and the possibilities to study it scientifically are analyzed, together with objections against Searle's view. Then Searle's account of the self is presented. The author argues that this account is not sufficient to explain subjectivity more deeply. Presentation of Damasio's theory follows as a complement to Searle 's theory. Damasio takes the sense of self to be a necessary component of consciousness that is pre-reflectively present and appears in the form of feeling. This notion of the self is supported in the thesis for it allows for better understanding of the phenomenal aspects of consciousness and also forms a basis for a possible scientific research. Damasio's biological hypotheses concerning the emergence of the subjectivity is discussed and criticised though for presupposing the subject, which is yet to be explained by the theory.
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René Descartes - the human good as a onto-theology
Zika, Richard ; Sobotka, Milan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee) ; Glombíček, Petr (referee)
At the beginning of Descartes's Regulae ad directionem ingenii we can find a call for secure knowledge which should be the point of departure for all meaningful human activities. The idea of secure knowledge is here gradually taking the form of universa} wisdom or 'good minď (i.e. rationality), of method and mathesis universalis, of a doctrine of arrangement and measurement. An example of manifestation of rationality (and, hence, activity) of Cartesian knowledge i s the rejection of Aristotelian-scholastic idea of the order of categories of entia as a speciously self-evident, immediately given clue to guide the cognitive process. In this context the rejection has also involved the notion of substance as a given absolute and that of accidentals, relative to it ('respecting' it). The old ontology does, however, assert itself in Descartes's method: the 'good minď acquiring knowledge becomes the 'substance' of the world as being acquired knowledge of; all objects of knowledge, and, as such, of arrangement, 'respecť it, are 'accidental' to it. Nevertheless the 'good minď acquiring knowledge (making arrangements) is, in its activity, not only the 'substance' (ousía) of the world as being acquired knowledge of but, in unity with this, also its principle, arkhé, cause. The Cartesian method is therefore not only...
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Berkeley's metaphysics and epistemology between common sense and science
Tomeček, Marek ; Moural, Josef (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee) ; Berman, David (referee)
The aim of the dissertation is to provide a sympathetic interpretation of Berkeley's immaterialism that does not proceed on the assumption that there is something fundamentally wrong with the system itself. Careful close reading uncovers new semantic relationships between important philosophical concepts in immaterialism. Although traditionally viewed as anti common-sense, Berkeley devotes one whole book to explaining his position on common sense. He claims that his system is closer to it than materialism because it does not distort the meanings of such key words as "know", "certain" and "real". Furthermore, he empties words "external object", "absolute existence" etc. of their meaning, thus precluding the very semantic framework within which the traditional debate about realism, idealism, phenomenalism and solipsism takes place. Berkeley's own definition of the object of perception is to be found primarily in his scientific theory of vision, from which it is generalized into a metaphysics. And since his optical programme provides a psychology of vision, also the immaterialist metaphysical underpinning limits itself to connecting ideas as psychological entities private to each perceiver and construing objects of perception out of them. But if things are just collections of ideas and ideas are mind-dependent...
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Personal identity and memory (Locke's theory of personal identity and its critical interpretation in analytical philosophy)
Kollmann, Jan ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
The thesis deals with the relations between Locke's theory of personal identity, its "classical" critic, performed by Butler and Reid and its critical adoption amongst some authors of analytic philosophy (Grice, Quinton, Perry, Shoemaker). In the first part of the thesis, Locke is shown as the founder of a tradition that lays stress on the fundamental relation between the identity of persons over time and its memory or consciousness. We also distinguish the identity of person and the identity of man, this means person is understood as identical so far as its consciousness reaches, independently of the identity of material and/or immaterial substance in which the identity of man consists. Serious problems with Locke's conception, such as amnesia and paramnesia are discussed in this part too. In the second part of the thesis, classical objections against Locke's theory are analyzed - Reid's "brave officer paradox" and Butler's objection of petitio principii; Reid's and Butler's distinction between 86 the identity of persons and other things. In the third part we discuss two conceptions by contemporary authors (Grice and Quinton) who defend Locke's attitude against the classical objections and who assert, that personal identity consists in a certain sort of psychological continuity (continuity of memory or...
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John Locke - primary and secondary qualities
Štambachová, Lucie ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
Mé zkoumání se v této práci zaměřuje na Lockovu Esej o lidském rozumu (An Essay concerning Human Understanding) z roku 1689, zvláště pak na Lockovo stanovisko k problematice primárních a sekundárních kvalit. Řekněme si však na úvod alespoň základní informace o samotném Lockovi a jeho životě. Locke se narodil roku 1632 jako syn právníka. Studoval na Christ Church College v Oxfordu, kde roku 1658 získal titul mistra svobodných umění. Locke pracoval jako soukromý učitel, lékař, ale také ve státních službách. Mezi jeho díla, kromě výše zmíněné Eseje, patří například Dvě pojednání o občanské vládě (Two Treatises of Civil Government), Myšlenky o vychování (Thoughts concerning Education), Listy o snášenlivosti (A Letter on Toleration) atd. Ze skladby jeho děl je patrné, že Locke byl velmi všestranný myslitel a kromě otázek epistemologických a ontologických se soustředil rovněž na politickou filosofii a na podmínky výchovy a vzdělání. Locke byl zastáncem a jedním z tvůrců tzv. novověkého empirismu, což byl směr vymezující se vůči racionalismu, jehož zakladatelem byl René Descartes. Obě tyto školy si kladly shodné otázky, ale odpovědi, které na ně dávaly, byly různé. Zásadní rozdíl tkví v tom, že empiristé hledali pravdu ve zkušenosti, racionalisté v rozumu. Z těchto protikladných východisek se odvíjejí odlišné...
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Berkeley's approach to Newtonian dynamics
Mihálik, Jakub ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
The essay concerns Berkeley's reaction to Newton's dynamics. While Berkeley admires the usefulness, simplicity and generality of Newton's laws of motion, he is, none the less, concerned with their possible ontological implications. If we interpret Newton in a realist manner, his doctrines seem to imply that physical objects are active and are thus inconsistent with the basic principles of Berkeley's metaphysics, namely with the view that the only sources of activity in the universe are spirits. Berkeley tries to solve this conflict by offering an account of force according to which force is a mathematical hypothesis and which thus avoids metaphysical commitments. The author suggests that there is a tension between different claims that Berkeley makes about force in De motu and offers an interpretation of Berkeley's view in which he tries to avoid this tension. According to the offered interpretation, Berkeley's view of force is an instrumentalist one. In the last chapter various aspects of Berkeley's view of force as a mathematical hypothesis are considered. It is argued that even though such a view might seem to be in conflict with Berkeley's semantic and metaphysical views, it needn't be so if certain semantic considerations introduced in Berkeley's Alciphron are considered.
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The human being out of the scope of the Descartes' metaphysical project of Meditations
Hulanová, Magda ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
Velmi stručně bychom mohli shrnout výsledek dosavadního zkoumání do jediné věty: přijmeme-li Descartovo tvrzení, že metafyzické meditace mají vybudovat základy věd(ění) poznáním prvních principů, pak lze říci, že pojednání o lidské přirozenosti ze Šesté meditace svým diskursem do metafyzického rámce Meditací nepatří, ačkoliv jen díky němu tvoří Meditace jediný a organický celek. Ve své diplomové práci jsme si vytkli za cíl otestovat tvrzení, že pojednáním o lidské přirozenosti ze Šesté meditace překračuje Descartes svůj vlastní záměr, totiž záměr vybudovat jisté a nezpochybnitelné kořeny veškerého vědění. Právě Meditace o první filosofii, jak jsme ukázali ve druhé kapitole, se měly věnovat výhradně metafyzickému zkoumání, které by vedlo k nalezení prvních příčin neboli principů poznání. Meditace měly představovat naplnění Descartova úsilí založit vědu na zcela jistých a nezpochybnitelných základech. Má-li celá fyzikální přírodověda spíše pravděpodobnostní charakter, neboli je-li pravdivá pouze natolik, nakolik umožňuje bezrozporné vysvětlení přírodních jevů, pak to má být podle Descarta metafyzika, jejíž poznatky prvních principů budou mít zcela pravdivý charakter a která bude podkladem fyziky a veškeré vědy vůbec. A opíráme-li se ve fyzice i jiných vědách především o smíšené poznatky smyslového vnímání, v...
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Error in Descartes' philosophy
Klinka, Tomáš ; Hill, James (referee) ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor)
The present work analyses the theory of error of René Descartes, mainly in the context of his Fourth Meditation. This analyze begins with the exposition of the Descartes' theory of judgment and his notions of understanding and volition. The main question is the following: Is Descartes' theory of error valid, even if we consider all the objections of Descartes' critics? The maill objection is: in the explication of error during our judgment as a result of interaction between a limited understanding and an unlimited human will, we have to consider us capable do decide at will what we believe and what we don't, which is not an intuitive position. But this work suggests that this non-intuitive position is sustainable, if we abandon the "strong" version of Descartes' voluntarism, in which the will influences our believes directly, and we see Descartes' theory of error as using the "milder" version of voluntarism (called here "attention" voluntarism), in which the will influence us indirectly, by forcing our attention in the needed way. As a final conclusion, we consider Descartes' theory of error as valid.
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