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Essays on Allocations in Two-Sided Markets
Šedek, Jan ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Miralles, Antonio (referee) ; Serena, Marco (referee)
Chapter 1 studies strategy-proofness in a congested market with asymmetric information and interdependences in players preferences. The market consists of players and depletable locations. Knowing about the asymmetries of in- formation and interdependences in preferences, the players choose one of two locations. In case of congestion, the rejected players are costlessly allocated to the other location. We show that, under correlated preferences, asymmetric information causes strategy-proofness to fail. We further provide a character- ization of strategy-proofness of the allocation mechanism. Finally, we provide several sufficient conditions for strategy-proofness including independence of preferences. Chapter 2 studies information acquisition incentives and welfare in a con- gested market with independent preferences. The players first learn about their preferences over two locations, after which they choose a location. In case of congestion, the rejected players are costlessly allocated to the other loca- tion. First, we show that for independent preferences, the allocation game with information acquisition tends to exhibit complementarities in information ac- quisition. This results in equilibrium multiplicity. Second, we show that due to prevailing positive externalities the equilibrium, in which more...
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