Home > Search Results: Polishchuk, Valentina
Search:
Search Tips :: Advanced Search
Search collections:
Sort by: Display results: Output format:
National Repository of Grey Literature 1 records found  Search took 0.01 seconds. 
Collusion in Public Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Russia
 Polishchuk, Valentina ; Korovkin, Vasily (advisor) ; Zacchia, Paolo (referee)
This paper documents collusion between firms using micro-level data on 4.4 million first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions conducted in Russia in 2011−2017. The data contains unique information on the timestamps of all bids and the bidding data itself. This study is one of the first to use bid timing to design a method for detecting collusion between firms based on a simultaneous bidding pattern: bidders place bids simultaneously or within a small time interval. The method performs well and identifies at least 7−25% of winner - runner-up bid pairs as collusive in validation subsamples: the pharmaceutical industry, known for its propensity to collusion in Russia, and three cartels formed by pharmaceutical firms. In the main data, the share of collusive winner - runner-up bid pairs varies between 8% and 23%. For a more general case that considers the pairs of each bidder with four other auction participants closest in the rank price, the share of collusive bid pairs is around 13%. In both cases, the share of collusive bid pairs is the highest in two-bidder auctions and gradually declines as the number of bidders increases. Collusive firms tend to place bids simultaneously more frequently when a few bidders participate in auctions, because of higher chances of manipulating auction outcomes. I also document...
Detailed record

Interested in being notified about new results for this query?
Subscribe to the RSS feed.
Digital Repository :: Search :: Submit :: Personalize :: Help
Powered by Invenio v1.1.2
Maintained by admin.invenio@techlib.cz
This site is also available in the following languages:
Česky  English