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Galen Strawson's impossibility of (moral) responsibility
EDL, Tomáš
In this thesis I attempt to introduce Galen Strawson's position, which he adopts in the free will debate followed by the debate about his Basic Argument. While giving a de-tailed account of responsibility as a reflective rational responsiveness, I show that re-sponsibility is in no respect causa sui and therefore it is not impossible for human beings to reach it, explained with the reasons given by Strawson. I refuse steps B, C, 8, 9 and 10 of the Basic Argument. I claim that undetermined self-determination consists in the ability to make a decision in the light of actually revised principles of choice. Such revision is granted by actual ability to reflect the validity and adequacy of principles of choice in relation to motivating values in question by using methodical doubt as a universal tool do to so. Such reflection, with respect to what matters for decision making in question, is potentially ultimate. I claim that Strawson underestimates the uniqueness of reflective rationality especially, when missing the crucial difference between Fido the dog and Nemo the man in the situation of choice. Moreover, I suspect Strawson of excluding the subject of action or choice and its actual principles of choice from the realm of intelligible things. This leads to disruption of request to conception of the world as internally consistent and in principle attainable by human beings. Finally, I show why I find sophisticated fatalism problematic in both of its versions, deterministic as well as indeterministic.
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