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Essays on Fairness, Inequality, and Uncertainty
Babický, Vítězslav ; Ortmann, Andreas (advisor) ; Katuščák, Peter (referee) ; Servátka, Maroš (referee)
Chapter I. Recent theories of fairness (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) have typically used the assumption of ex ante known pie size. Here I explore theoretically the ramifications of pie size being unknown ex ante. Using a simple allocation problem known as dictator game, I find that attitude to fairness is systematically and intuitively related to risk and risk attitude. Results from informal experiments support the model proposed here. Chapter II. The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems - the Dictator and Ultimatum games - we explore whether, and exactly how, unknown pie sizes with varying degrees of risk ("endowment risk") influence individual behavior. We derive theoretical predictions for these games using utility functions that capture additively separable constant relative risk aversion and inequality aversion. We experimentally test the theoretical predictions using two subject pools: students at Czech Technical University and employees of Prague City Hall. We find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in...
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