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G. E. Moore: Criticism of the Metaphysical Ethics
Kolomý, Vojtěch ; Jirsa, Jakub (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The aim of this bachelor thesis is to expose the criticism of the Metaphysical Ethics that G. E. Moore presents in Chapter IV of his Principia Ethica. The core of the criticism is the so called naturalistic fallacy and therefore it is necessary to first explain what is meant by this fallacy. In the first part of the thesis it is shown that the naturalistic fallacy lies in confusing the property that we call "good" with another property that accompanies it, but is not identical with it. In the second part it is analysed what Moore means by the Metaphysical Ethics, how they include the naturalistic fallacy, what reasons led the Metaphysical Ethics into this fallacy and, generally, what influence may Metaphysics have upon the Ethics.

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