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Experiments in Corruptibility
Momotenko, Iryna ; Ortmann, Andreas (advisor) ; Frank, Björn (referee) ; Abbink, Klaus (referee)
vii Abstract This thesis theoretically, but mostly experimentally, investigates corruptibility and ways to fight corruption. In the first chapter, I investigate if an individual is more likely to behave corruptly if she believes that the majority of his/her peers are behaving in a similar manner. I also study what motivates an individual to follow the behavior of others more: knowing that the majority behaves corruptly or the willingness to fulfill the expectations of one's peers. I use a one-shot reverse public goods experiment to provide answers to these questions. The results suggest the existence of a peer effect of corrupt behavior. Expectations of the number of corrupt peers are found to be the main source of subjects' anti-social behavior. In the second chapter, I question the rationale behind previous research results on the relationship between officials' wages and the level of corruption. In the light of counterintuitive empirical findings by Schulze et al. (2016) and Chen and Liu (2018), I investigate the wages- corruption relationship by means of a laboratory experiment, using a robust version of a bribery game with four different relative wages for public officials. I also introduce a new method of assigning different wages to participants, which helps to reduce self-selection based on ability,...
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