Original title: A note on equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Authors: Celik, Levent ; Karabay, B.
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2011
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 440
Abstract: The Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining model predicts a payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which players' equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. In this note, we present a modified version of the Baron-Ferejohn model by introducing veto players and provide a sufficient condition to obtain a truly unique SSPE in terms of payoffs as well as players' equilibrium strategies.
Keywords: equilibrium uniqueness; ultilateral bargaining; veto players
Project no.: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 (CEP)

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp440.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0197658

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-71600


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