Original title: Electing the pope: elections by repeated ballots
Authors: Ponsatí, C. ; Zápal, Jan
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2026
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 815
Abstract: A finite group of voters must elect the pope from a finite set of candidates. They repeatedly cast ballots (possibly for ever) until one candidate attains at least Q votes. A candidate is electable—if enough voters prefer him to a continuous disagreement—as well as stable—if no other candidate is preferred to him by a sufficient number of voters. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a candidate that is both electable and stable. When there are three candidates and voters are willing to compromise somewhat, the condition requires choice by two-thirds supermajority, which coincides with the procedure that the Catholic Church has used to appoint the pope for almost a millennium.
Keywords: conclave; pope; repeated ballots

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp815.pdf
Original record: https://hdl.handle.net/11104/0378565

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-697446


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