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> When is it optimal to delegate: the theory of fast-track authority
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Original title:
When is it optimal to delegate: the theory of fast-track authority
Authors:
Celik, Levent
;
Karabay, B.
;
McLaren, J.
Document type:
Research reports
Year:
2013
Language:
eng
Series:
CERGE-EI Research Seminar Series
, volume: May 27, 2013
Keywords:
fast-track authority
;
multilateral legislative bargaining
;
trade policy
Institution:
Economics Institute AS ČR (
web
)
Document availability information:
Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL:
http://iweb.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/events/papers/130527_t.pdf
Original record:
http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0224195
Permalink:
http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-156579
The record appears in these collections:
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>
Institutes ASCR
>
Economics Institute
Reports
>
Research reports
Record created 2013-09-30, last modified 2021-11-24
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