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Conception of an Object as a Complex of Perceptions in David Hume's Philosophy
Fršlínek, Jan ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
Práce pojednává o objektu (jakožto komplexu percepcí) a s daným tématem souvisejícími otázkami v kontextu filosofie Davida Huma, jak je obsažena především v první knize jeho díla Treatise of Human Nature a rovněž s přihlédnutím k dílům Enquiry Concerning Human Undestanding a An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature a dalším titulům primární a sekundární literatury. Tematizováno je v tomto kontextu tedy nejprve Humovo pojetí percepcí jako takové (a to na základě první kapitoly Treatisu, Of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction etc.). Poté je v souvislosti s předchozím pojednáno i o Humově pojetí identity (především objektu-tělesa) a jeho koncepce individuace, resp. i stálosti a koherence. (a to na základě čtvrté kapitoly Of scepticism with regard to senses). Na konci práce jsou kontrastovány různé možné typy objektů, jež lze (dle autora této práce) chápat jako komplexy percepcí a poté je nabídnuto schéma hypotézy o individuaci tzv. materiálních těles (bodies) v prostoru.
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From Descates' Mind to Kant's Reason
Dekastello, Petr ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The basic subject-matter of my research is R. Descartes' Meditations On First Philosophy and I examine the term intellect and its position within the mind and its relation to thought. My work includes a study of sensation and imagination which provide the intellect with "material" to judge. The objective of my thesis is to demonstrate the role the intellect plays in terms of reason and to present an interpretation of the way in which the mind is designated in relation to reason according to Rene Descartes in his writing and in his responses to objections. The position and functions of the intellect are understood as a logical structure of mutual dependence and as the elements essential for the understanding of the human soul substance. At the end of my thesis I demonstrate that the system of reason of R. Descartes might be considered as the basis for the transcendental conception of reason in Kant's philosophy, which leads to an idealistic world conception and is founded on thinking a priori. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge. A Study on the Role of the Subject and the Awareness of Thought in Descartes' Philosophy
Kollert, Lukáš ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The thesis aims at examining Descartes's so called cogito from a wider perspective, especially as regards to the role in the development of Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) and in the context of other relevant texts. Being an attempt to give a broad account of Descartes's "first cognition" the study deals not only with the cogito itself, e.g. with its logical structure, but also with other key Cartesian doctrines, so that we can understand the cogito as an integral part of Descartes's philosophy. The thesis inquires for this reason into the question of meditator's identity, the methodological skepticism, the question whether logical principles are called into question in the First meditation, the problem of the Cartesian circle, the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas and finally, the question how to explain, according to Descartes, the awareness of our thoughts. Sometimes the considerations become rather systematic and go beyond a mere exegesis of Descartes's philosophy, especially when they concern the problem with the presence of ego in cogito and the explanation of our self-consciousness. There are three competing approaches to the second issue mentioned that are introduced and assessed in the last chapter. I have chosen this way of...
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Spinoza's Concept of the Individual
Petříček, Jan ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Švec, Ondřej (referee)
The aim of the proposed thesis is a partial reconstruction of Spinoza's theory of the individual. This theory can be found in Spinoza's Ethics and consists of three components: namely, Spinoza's doctrines of singular essences, of physical individuals and of conatus. In this thesis, we focus on the doctrine of conatus; however, since the three conceptions are tightly connected, the doctrines of physical individuals and of singular essences will be briefly touched upon as well. The starting point of our thesis is the following problem: Spinoza simultaneously uses multiple terms to designate conatus - and those terms seem, at least at the first sight, to have very different meanings. Specifically speaking, Spinoza identifies conatus with "power of acting", "force of existing" and "actual essence". First, we present a brief explanation of meanings of those terms and subsequently we attempt to reconcile them. In order to be able to do so, we expound Spinoza's doctrine of essences in more detail; afterwards we show that the aforementioned terms can indeed be reconciled if conatus is understood as force by which an essence produces its necessary properties. In the next step, however, we discover that this conception of conatus is not yet wholly adequate, because it disregards the fact that an essence can...
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G. E. Moore: Criticism of the Metaphysical Ethics
Kolomý, Vojtěch ; Jirsa, Jakub (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The aim of this bachelor thesis is to expose the criticism of the Metaphysical Ethics that G. E. Moore presents in Chapter IV of his Principia Ethica. The core of the criticism is the so called naturalistic fallacy and therefore it is necessary to first explain what is meant by this fallacy. In the first part of the thesis it is shown that the naturalistic fallacy lies in confusing the property that we call "good" with another property that accompanies it, but is not identical with it. In the second part it is analysed what Moore means by the Metaphysical Ethics, how they include the naturalistic fallacy, what reasons led the Metaphysical Ethics into this fallacy and, generally, what influence may Metaphysics have upon the Ethics.
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The Analysis of Personal Identity in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature
Sýkorová, Tereza ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Karásek, Jindřich (referee)
This bachelor's thesis puts forward an interpretation of David Hume's analysis of personal identity in his Treatise of Human Nature, as well as an interpretation of his subsequent doubts expressed in the Appendix. In the first part of the thesis an interpretation of Hume's theory of mind as a "bundle of perceptions", as well as an interpretation of his explanation of our propension to regard this bundle as a synchronically and diachronically identical entity is presented, after an introduction describing the philosophical discourse around personal identity, Hume's conception of philosophy and his revisionist ontology. In the second part an interpretation of the passage from the Appendix is presented, in which Hume expresses dissatisfaction with his account of personal identity. In this thesis I hold the view that the main source of Hume's dissatisfaction is the fact that the idea of the mind as a collection of all present perceptions interconnected through causal relations, which Hume held for a true idea and which serves as an implied foundation of the whole first book of the Treatise, turned out to be fictitious, just as all the other metaphysical ideas. His explanation of our propension to regard the collection of perceptions as a synchronically and diachronically identical entity, which is...
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Material world in the system of pre-established harmony
Kožíšek, Jakub ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
In my thesis I will be engaged in Leibniz's conception of material world in the system of pre-established harmony. In Leibniz's philosophy bodies exist at least on two different levels of reality. We can think of them as aggregates of simple, not extended substances - monads, or on phenomenal level, as well founded phenomena, which are only representations of monads. My primary aim is to examine, how these two conceptions of material world connected are.
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The concept of mind at the beginning of modern philosophy
Kadlec, David ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The essay concerns itself with the concept of mind in John Locke's and René Descartes' philosophy. The main focus lies on the abilities of human soul, that is understanding and will, and its ontological properties. The work tackles questions regarding personal identity, freedom of will, and the kind of substance that a mind is. Both systems are, after their introduction, critically examined, and their strengths and weaknesses are compared. The difference between both philosophers crystallizes towards the end of the piece in their view on the immateriality or materiality of mind. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Does consciousness exhaust the nature of thought? The meaning of Descartes's term "cogitare"
Sedláková, Jana ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Švec, Ondřej (referee)
The aim of this thesis is to deal with the problems which arise from interpretations of Descartes' term "cogitare". It concentrates on the deconstruction of the orthodox interpretations which explain the term "cogitare" as "to be conscious". The thesis aims at introducing three alternative interpretations from Czech academic environment, the one of James Hill, of Petr Glombíček, and of Tomáš Marvan. I would like to refer to the problems of orthodox reading as well as to benefits and losses of the other interpretations. I will proceed through analysis of sensory perceptions, emotions and dream. The purpose of the thesis is not to find the definite meaning of "cogitare", but to make the readers familiar with these problems and their interpretations which I find more plausible than the orthodox interpretation. The term "consciousness" is a complex term which needs to be explained in order to be capable of explaining other philosophical problems. Keywords: Descartes, thinking, consciousness, sensory perceptions, emotions, dream, self-reflection, judgment, propositional content
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Notions Subject and Object, Soul and Body and their Relationship in Descates' Meditations on First Philosophy
Rabas, Martin ; Čapek, Jakub (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The aim of the study is to analyse, on the basis of Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, the scope of the terms "soul" and "body" and to derive what meaning may be in the light of them given to the modern terms "subject" and "object." The primary question is what the respective essences of res cogitans and res extensa consist in. To achieve this goal, the study interprets relevant passages from Descartes' work and highlights its standpoints and the main ontological decisions Descartes makes. The point of this questioning is to understand his novel conception of the relation between man and the world that became determining for the modern era. Later philosophers up to this day have often considered Descartes' dualism between soul and body as a philosophical concept that should be abandoned. The aim of the work is therefore to understand what negatives result from this concept.
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