|
|
Measuring Market Power: The Czech Market of Mobile Operators
Kolomazníková, Barbora ; Koubek, Ivo (advisor) ; Hayat, Arshad (referee)
The main focus of the thesis is the measurement of market power. Since market power is a determinant of the degree of competition, its measurement is the key feature of competition policy. We present various methods for assessing market power. One of the most famous ones are Lerner index and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, both of which belong to SCP paradigm. Another group of measures are the NEIO models, which provide the empirical analysis of relevant markets. For the estimation of market power, we have chosen the czech market of mobile oper- ators. We examine the three largest operators (i.e. O2, T-Mobile and Vodafone) in the period 2000-2013. Firstly, the model of Röller and Parker (1997) is used to identify the market's structure. Secondly, we employ the Appelbaum's (1982) industry-level measure to estimate market power. Keywords: market power, market structure, Lerner index, competition, industrial orga- nization, mobile operator, telecommunications Supervisor's e-mail address: koubek@fsv.cuni.cz Author's e-mail address: barbora.kolomaznikova@centrum.cz 1
|
|
|
Interaction between Macroprudential and Monetary Policies, and Bank Runs
Kolomazníková, Barbora ; Hlaváček, Michal (advisor) ; Geršl, Adam (referee)
The thesis focuses on the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies in the presence of bank runs. In particular, it is examined whether the two policies should be conducted separately or jointly, and whether the occurence of a bank run affects the result. Furthermore, it is studied how a bank run impacts the efficiency of the two policies. \\ The baseline results suggest that cooperation between the two policies is less efficient than when they are determined separately. The reason might be a coordination issue that arises because the same objective is being assigned to both policies in the cooperative case. On the other hand, when facing a bank run the cooperative regime achieves a higher degree of financial stability by reducing the probability of a next run. This is caused by the fact that cooperating authorities choose more aggresive macroprudential policy when a bank run occurs. A bank run itself does not change the ranking of the two policy regimes. However, an occurence of a bank run induces higher efficiency of both policies, irrespective of the regime in place. In addition, the policies are more effective when they face financial shocks, as opposed to a productivity shock.
|
|
|
Measuring Market Power: The Czech Market of Mobile Operators
Kolomazníková, Barbora ; Koubek, Ivo (advisor) ; Hayat, Arshad (referee)
The main focus of the thesis is the measurement of market power. Since market power is a determinant of the degree of competition, its measurement is the key feature of competition policy. We present various methods for assessing market power. One of the most famous ones are Lerner index and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, both of which belong to SCP paradigm. Another group of measures are the NEIO models, which provide the empirical analysis of relevant markets. For the estimation of market power, we have chosen the czech market of mobile oper- ators. We examine the three largest operators (i.e. O2, T-Mobile and Vodafone) in the period 2000-2013. Firstly, the model of Röller and Parker (1997) is used to identify the market's structure. Secondly, we employ the Appelbaum's (1982) industry-level measure to estimate market power. Keywords: market power, market structure, Lerner index, competition, industrial orga- nization, mobile operator, telecommunications Supervisor's e-mail address: koubek@fsv.cuni.cz Author's e-mail address: barbora.kolomaznikova@centrum.cz 1
|
guest ::
