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The legacy of philosophical behaviourism: the concept of mind without minds
Soutor, Milan ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
The epistemological problem of unity and its development in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell is the main subject of this essay. The first chapter is devoted to naïve realism developed by G. E. Moore and adopted by early Russell. I explain the notion of objective unity of proposition. The second chapter concerns Russell's departure from naïve realism and the multiple relation of judgment which Wittgenstein's criticism rendered as fatally unable to handle the problem of synthetic unity. The breakdown of this theory led Russell to naturalism, which is the topic of the last chapter. I pay special attention to the regressive argument proposed in slightly different versions by Moore, L. Wittgenstein and G. Ryle. Keywords realism, neutral monism, behaviorism, unity, consciousness
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Philosophical possibilities of question of personal identity
Endrle, Jaroslav ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
(in English): The topic of this thesis is the problem of personal identity. Its aim is to develop alternative approach to this question. To achieve this, the following course is choosen. Firstly, three most important assumptions are exposed. These assumptions steer debate about this topic in analytic philosophy and are regarded as main cause of its difficulties. These suppositions are - the ontological conception of identity, logical dissociability of mind and body and the method of thought experiment. Essential part of following thesis can be taken as proposal of technique that can overcome these assumptions and problems they cause. This attempt begins at the end of first part with development of general criticism of ontological conception of identity and with presentation of epistemic conception of identity. The second and crucial part deals with the theory of conceptual system. This theory provides a basis for alternative approach to question of personal identity. It will block the logical dissociability of criterions of personal identity - the dissociability of mind/consciousness and living body. It will also serve as fundament for epistemic conception of identity. Finaly, it is used for tracing the origin of concept "person". It will be shown that the concept of person descends from the...
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The concept of mind at the beginning of modern philosophy
Kadlec, David ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The essay concerns itself with the concept of mind in John Locke's and René Descartes' philosophy. The main focus lies on the abilities of human soul, that is understanding and will, and its ontological properties. The work tackles questions regarding personal identity, freedom of will, and the kind of substance that a mind is. Both systems are, after their introduction, critically examined, and their strengths and weaknesses are compared. The difference between both philosophers crystallizes towards the end of the piece in their view on the immateriality or materiality of mind. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Human Nature by Benedict de Spinoza
Haiklová, Markéta ; Jirsa, Jakub (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
This paper consists of more parts. Firstly, it includes a theoretical introduction on Spinoza's concept of substance, substantial attributes and modes of extension and thought. The theoretical introduction serves as a background for the following examination of human nature in Spinoza's Ethics. In the chapters concerning human nature, which are introduced by chapters on intellect, imagination, memory and three different kinds of knowledge, our idea of "double nature" is presented. This characteristic of nature is deductible from the concept of adequate and inadequate knowledge and it becomes a presupposition for our further interpretation, which deals with the problem of parallelism/dualism of modes of extension and thought. This topic is treated in part V of Ethics where also the question of destruction of human body and the eternal part of mind is discussed.
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From Descates' Mind to Kant's Reason
Dekastello, Petr ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The basic subject-matter of my research is R. Descartes' Meditations On First Philosophy and I examine the term intellect and its position within the mind and its relation to thought. My work includes a study of sensation and imagination which provide the intellect with "material" to judge. The objective of my thesis is to demonstrate the role the intellect plays in terms of reason and to present an interpretation of the way in which the mind is designated in relation to reason according to Rene Descartes in his writing and in his responses to objections. The position and functions of the intellect are understood as a logical structure of mutual dependence and as the elements essential for the understanding of the human soul substance. At the end of my thesis I demonstrate that the system of reason of R. Descartes might be considered as the basis for the transcendental conception of reason in Kant's philosophy, which leads to an idealistic world conception and is founded on thinking a priori. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Conception of an Object as a Complex of Perceptions in David Hume's Philosophy
Fršlínek, Jan ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
Práce pojednává o objektu (jakožto komplexu percepcí) a s daným tématem souvisejícími otázkami v kontextu filosofie Davida Huma, jak je obsažena především v první knize jeho díla Treatise of Human Nature a rovněž s přihlédnutím k dílům Enquiry Concerning Human Undestanding a An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature a dalším titulům primární a sekundární literatury. Tematizováno je v tomto kontextu tedy nejprve Humovo pojetí percepcí jako takové (a to na základě první kapitoly Treatisu, Of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction etc.). Poté je v souvislosti s předchozím pojednáno i o Humově pojetí identity (především objektu-tělesa) a jeho koncepce individuace, resp. i stálosti a koherence. (a to na základě čtvrté kapitoly Of scepticism with regard to senses). Na konci práce jsou kontrastovány různé možné typy objektů, jež lze (dle autora této práce) chápat jako komplexy percepcí a poté je nabídnuto schéma hypotézy o individuaci tzv. materiálních těles (bodies) v prostoru.
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Manipulation and moral responsibility
Kalivodová, Hana ; Marvan, Tomáš (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
In recent philosophy debates, conflicting views persist on the influence of manipulation on moral responsibility of individuals. One side sees manipulation as not different from any other deterministic environmental influence on the agent, others advocate for historicism - the idea of deviant causal route - if manipulation is present in the agent's history. Historicist account of moral responsibility is based on disruption of natural development, but this may not be trivial to detect in cases of covert non-constraining control and social conditioning. In addition, opinions on the resulting responsibility of the agent are influenced by intuitions on her identity, locus of control and nature of motivating reasons. The aim of this thesis is to map the recent debate and identify the factors playing the role while searching for the borderline of responsibility of the manipulated agent. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Idealism between Leibniz and Berkeley
Raboch, Filip ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
While Berkeley's position on the materialism of the world is undoubtedly idealistic, Leibniz's position is somewhat problematic: in metaphysical texts, he seems to be an idealist, while in texts concerned with natural philosophy and physics, he seems more like a dualist similar to Aristotle. We will even see that Leibniz wants to be both an idealist/phenomenalist and a realist. Moreover, in his remarks to Berkeley, he criticizes Berkeley's idealism and his rejection of matter. The aim of this paper is to map Leibniz's idealistic position, compare it with Berkeley's, and decide whether Leibniz's objections to Berkeley are justified and whether their positions are any similar
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