National Repository of Grey Literature 2 records found  Search took 0.00 seconds. 
Philosophy of Ordinary Language - its Decline and What to Do After It
Ivan, Michal ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Peregrin, Jaroslav (referee) ; Tomeček, Marek (referee)
The general topic of the thesis is the history of the Ordinary Language Philosophy. To be more precise, it deals with the critical arguments, which were raised against is. The thesis offers a short historical and sociological review of the Ordinary Language Philosophy. Critical analysis shows two things: 1) the main reason for the rejection was a different understanding of meaning (and consequences of such a understanding); 2) critics begged the question and already assumed the justification of these rejections in their arguments. The area of this criticism was: the paradigm case argument, the empirical nature of the statements of meaning produced by the Ordinary Language Philosophy, the structural elements of meaning and the political implications of the theory of meaning. The thesis criticizes the Ordinary Language Philosophy in those parts (and in such interpretations), where its understanding of meaning does not differ from the understanding of the critics and where they share common assumptions. On the other hand, the thesis argues for an interpretation, which avoids classical understanding of meaning in all its consequences. Finally, the thesis asks how the Ordinary Language Philosophy can be useful for contemporary debates.
Berkeley's metaphysics and epistemology between common sense and science
Tomeček, Marek ; Moural, Josef (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee) ; Berman, David (referee)
The aim of the dissertation is to provide a sympathetic interpretation of Berkeley's immaterialism that does not proceed on the assumption that there is something fundamentally wrong with the system itself. Careful close reading uncovers new semantic relationships between important philosophical concepts in immaterialism. Although traditionally viewed as anti common-sense, Berkeley devotes one whole book to explaining his position on common sense. He claims that his system is closer to it than materialism because it does not distort the meanings of such key words as "know", "certain" and "real". Furthermore, he empties words "external object", "absolute existence" etc. of their meaning, thus precluding the very semantic framework within which the traditional debate about realism, idealism, phenomenalism and solipsism takes place. Berkeley's own definition of the object of perception is to be found primarily in his scientific theory of vision, from which it is generalized into a metaphysics. And since his optical programme provides a psychology of vision, also the immaterialist metaphysical underpinning limits itself to connecting ideas as psychological entities private to each perceiver and construing objects of perception out of them. But if things are just collections of ideas and ideas are mind-dependent...

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1 Tomeček, Michal
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