Original title: Private and public IPR protection in a vertically differentiated software duopoly
Authors: Žigić, Krešimir ; Střelický, J. ; Kúnin, Michael
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2020
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 671
Abstract: We study the interaction between public and private intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in a duopoly in which software developers offer a product variety of differing quality and compete for heterogeneous users, who have an option to buy a legal version, possibly use an illegal copy, or not buy a product at all. Illegal usage implies violation of IPR and is punishable. A developer may use private IPR protection for his software if the level of piracy is high. An important intermediate step in our analysis addresses firms’ pricing strategies and the analysis of the impact of both private and public IPR protection on these strategies (with monopoly serving as a benchmark case). Last but not least, we make some comparisons with an analogous model based on horizontal product differentiation.
Keywords: Bertrand competition; software piracy; vertically differentiated duopoly

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp671.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0311509

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-432266


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Research > Institutes ASCR > Economics Institute
Reports > Research reports
 Record created 2020-12-03, last modified 2023-12-06


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